Moscow's New "Peace Offensive" Toward Japan
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Moscow's New "Peace Offensive" Toward Japan
Moscow's
"Peace Offensiic" Toward Japan
Soviet Union is attemptingew dialogue wiih ihe Japanese
on economic and security issues. Moscow apparently hopes to eiplojl differences between Japan and the United States on the proper level of Japanese defense spending. It is seeking to encourage pacifist, antinuclear sentiment in Japan to make it more difficult for the Suiuki government to convince the Japanese public of the need for increased defense spendinc The Soviets also arc attempting to exploit Japan's distaste for economic sanctions and its differences with the United States over the US-Japanese trade imbalance in order to gain more access to Japanese technology and investment. Nevertheless, the Northern Territories issueajor impediment to any significant improvement in relations. The Japanese Government is aware of Soviet objectives and is not likely lo change itsand foreign policiesesult of Moscow's tactics
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Moscow's New "Pence Offensive" Toward Japan
SoiidSoviets hive taken seven* initialises over (he pad five mom hi lo put a
more positive face on iheir poor rclalioni with Japan. The thrust of this campaign has been to portray Moscowreasonable" partner with whom Tokvo should engage In a'new dialogue. The Soviets have. a( (he same lime, tonedheir criticism oforeign policy. They also seem to havepecial effort to avoid major gaffes in their dealings wiih the Japanese. This approacharked departure from (he USSR's frequently arrogant behavior toward Japan in the past
Soviet Premier Tikhonov's February interview inihe most influential Japaneseone of the most prominent actions taken in the broad "peace offensiveikhonov reiterated,ore positive fashion, some ol ihe themes ihai Foreign Minister Cromyko. other Soviet officials, and Ihe Soviet media have stressed in recent months These have included.
criticism ol Ihe United Slates and China fnr "raising len-.rons" in the world,oltening ol standard charges of Japanese "collusion" with (hose countries against (he USSR
suggestion ihat Japan emulate some of the West European stalesitself from the US stand on Afghanistan. Poland, and
Kampuchea
airly positive portrayal of Sino-Svict relations coupled -ith a
prediction that major problems will erupt eventually between China and lhc caprlahst countries, including Japan
An emphasis on the advantages Japan would gain from increased trade, economicincultural ccchangcs -iili the USSR
A firm, although less con tenuous. Stand On lhc Not them Territories -issue
President Urcihncv. speaking ai Tashkent onjrch. enlarged upon ihe Soviet position lie called on the Japanese to reconsider Moscow's proposal for Cunltdence-build ing measures (CBMsl in ihe Farmade in Februaryand reminded ihcm lhal bitaura! COM. could be negotiated, ibc Inter point had been made C > Tokyo and Bourne last August and in subsequent Soviet commentarie. Brezhnev's interne nt
1annul al othrriiiiiiSnifmcd Si.ie>bui ihr ehnin ofindKaiei Jkvio -as ihe primary
however, was the first public and authoritative proposal of such talks wiih ihe Japanese. Significantly, Biealincv omitted the standard assertion lhat because Ihe Japanese are IO blame for bilateral strains, il is up to Tokyo lo make ihe firsl move lo improve relations. His silence on ihrs poinlew Soviet willingness to meet the Japanese part way.
The Soviet media have followed up on Brezhnev's initiative by citing the positive responses of Japanese Diet members, trade union officials, and other public figures, as well as articles in ihe Japanese press. They havecharged that ihe main purpose of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's trip ro Japan in late March was lo press for increased defense Spending. These commentaries have contrasted Ihe US effort lo bolster theperimeter" in Ihe Far Kait wiih Soviet "peace proposals."
Meanwhile, the Soviets have intensified their effort* to achieve nuclear arms curb* and security guarantee* in fcasl Asia and the Pacific. In late February.wide-ranging letter responding loan Australian pence movement group-S-Soviet agreement lo limitactivities in Ihe Pacific region Replying in early Marchimilar appeal from Japanese intellectuals. Bicrhncvpecial agreement in which Moscow would pledge noi iousc nuclear weapons againsteiumapanese commitment to adhere to its longstanding prohibitionam si allowing nuclear arms on its territory. Moscow hasicd assurances thai it would not use nuclear weapons
plyo
agsmsi countries which did noi produce or acquire such weapons or allow ihem io be deployed on their territory, bututemcnl was (hee thai the Soviet! had openly and directlyormal agreement on Ihe matter with Japan
The Soviet! are. at the same lime, si ill sironjlyongolian proposal, advanced innon aggress ion pacf for Asian and Pacta siaies. They also continue to support the creationuclea.-frcc rone in Northeasi Asia. In ihis connection. Moscow has recentlyrms conirot specialists to Japan where Ihey had major interviews inin order to bypass Ihe government and gel Sov.ei views on disarmament issues on record -ith ihe Japanese public
Finally, ihe Sovicis arc trying to expand economic and cultural contacts with
Moscow*.imporiant mm.vc for thisd activity ,ss0
persuade Japan toore independent policy toward the United Slates, cipccially on defense matters The Soviets hope to cipltui differ encci between Tokyo and Washington over Ihe nature and csir.ni of the Soviet ihreal and the conscejuenl proper level for Japanese defense spending. The Soviets have, to Ihis end. attempted to encourage inhe same pacifist, aniinuclear thinking ihai is so much in cvulence in Western Europe and. in ihis connection.xploit cciSling concernUS nuclear policy They apparcntiy beli.-vc that US-Japanese diffcici.ee. regarding ihe natureestern sccanlyl. China enhance ihor chances of dividing Tokyo ami Wachinciiu
The Soviei "peace offensive" is only one pan of Moscow's efforts to work around ihe United Stateseriod of ilraincd bilateral relations, li la similar in several respectsetent Soviet cfforis to cultivate lhc Weil Europeans. la laci,may believe thai an improvement in Soviei. Japanese relations -ouKJ prcvrJe some encouragement for Ibc West Europeansund more indr pendent of (he Untiedrder so case EasiVVcsi tensions. Mmco-'i lone ranee goal on both fronts is for such developments tiltimaiety to lever the United Slates lowardore accommodeling policy toward (he Soviei Union.
Another major consideration is continuing Soviet interest in gaming accessapanese technology and persuading Japan to invest in Siberia Indeed. Western trade restrictions and Soviei domestic economic problems make ihiS an even more important motive for Moacow Japan showed signs last fall of moving away from ns post Afghanistan sanctions, but this neryspec* live move was hailedesult of the introduction of martial law in Poland Tbe Soviets realm, however, that the Japanese have not wantedel out in Ironi of the Wesi Europeans with regard io imposing sanctions lapan's recently announced economic measures against Poland and the USSR, which bing Japan into alignment with other US allies, probably appeared to the Soviets to be no moreeluctant concession Thehave repeatedly emphasized in their public corn men unci (hat (he Japanese Government yteldeoS pressure on (he sanctions issue largelyeduce ihe likelihood of US curbs on Japanese exports. The Soviets must, ai (he same nose,ie of certain steps ihe Japanese have taker, to limn ihe damage caused by iheir sanetroats -gemst lhc USSR, such as deluding the Sakhalin oil and natural gas developmenl protect The Sovseis apfuwently hope that ihey can encourage Japan locate us sanctions if ihey make concessions lo Tokyo on minor issues
The Soviets may tc-alite iheir request* earlier this year for deferment of payment on products purchased from Japan will make Tokyo even warier of expanding economic lies in ihe absenceoncurrent politicalvenireless, as US-Japanese differences mount about how to rectify the irade imbalance, the Soviet* appear to be signaling trie Japanese againeir desirabilityrade partner. In this connection, the USSR is itreising lhat ils economic needs complement, rather lhan compeie -iih Japanese economic goals.
Japanese have responded cautiously lo the recent Soviei initiative* and arc convinced iheie has been no real change in Ihe Soviei position on list key issues dividing Ihe Iwo sides. The Japanese, moreover, continue io insist lhat. if the USSR genuinely desires improved relations wiih Japan, it will have lo take concrete Steps to create conditions conducive to such an improvement They have, in this connection, repeatedly mentioned the needoviet withdrawal fromeduction of Soviei foreeson Japan's Northern Territories, and Soviei agreement lodiscuss Ihe territorial Question
Soviets are noi likel> to budge on any of these points bui eould accelerate their peace campaign by actingongstanding Japanese invitation for Gromykoijit Tokyo. They would probablylan'ivaiionul Japanese intentionsthe USSR beforeale formp
f,
The Soviets will be watching fof any signs thai Tokyo iiinieresled inialogue. If ihey perceive such signs, ihey could offeT minor eooeessioni lo Japanecisionromyko vbil. They could. Tor example, show neaiMily on such mailers as procedures for visits io Japanese graves on ihe Northern Islands or current rest rkl ions un Japanese fishing in waters adjacent lo lhai disputede- Asian arms controlan extension of Breihnev'soralo. nam proposal inalso have appeal for Ihe
The Soviets have noi been forthcoming on such issues in ihe past, probably because they believed ihai bilateral economic lies would progressack of movement on political issues. They may now be willing to make such relatively unimportanl gestures in order to revive the political dialogue '
Whatever blandishments the Soviets may use. the Noiihcrn Territories issue willajor impediment to improving relaiions. and there is little prospect of cither side yielding on the issue. Tbe locality is importani both strategically andymbol of Moscow's success in undoing Ihe embarrassing results of the Russo-Japawse War. Even more importani. Moscow fearsoviei concession on ihis issue would encourage China and other countries lo press their Ierracial claims against ihe USSR.e absence of any mrjor quid proquo. no Soviet leader is likely in the fore-sceabie futuretcgotiaica tarilorial adjustment with Japan This is particularly irueeadeishipsuccession struggle is unfolding in Moscow, as no contender wantse vulnerable to charges of being soft on national security
(Irtauir of Moscow's intransigence on ihe Northern Territories issue, the chances of ihe Soviet "peace offensive" yieldid end foe ihe USSK are small Tokyo has.ample, si reused lhai il can hardly take Moscow's CUM proposal seriously when Ihe Soviet Union refutes lo leHrteio-sh occupied Japanese islands, the key step necessaryuild Japanese confidence in the USSRres, moreover, thai Moscow -arts to sow discord between Japan and the Untied Stales and China.t wiH not permit the Kremlin to use fobtemi in ihis triangular relation ship (or Mi own cad The Soviei motive in ciscouraging pacirnm and antiniKlcai sentiments in Japan is similarly transparent to ihe Japanese
1
me same lime,kyo will be cuntinualiy asscsslnu the unities ol the Uniied Stales and ihe West Europeans toward the USSR, and ihe Japaneir will adjust iheir policies to those of the Uniied Slates and in NATO allies
Original document.
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